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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The State of Utah (the "State") has filed a Brief as 
an intervenor in this action, predictably supporting the 
position of the Appellants Roger Sharp ("Sharp") and Tim W. 
Healy ("Healy") that this Court wrongly decided Condemarin v. 
University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989) and that the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act") is constitutional. 
To the extent that the State merely mimics the arguments of 
Sharp and Healy, Appellee Shelly Hipwell ("Hipwell") will not 
further burden the record on this appeal with a response. 
However, Hipwell will respond in this Brief to certain 
arguments raised by the State. 
As will be demonstrated below, none of the grounds 
upon which the State seeks to have this Court overrule its 
decision in Condemarin are well taken and the decision of the 
district court should be affirmed. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE GOVERNMENTAL/PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION APPLIED 
TO THE STATE AT COMMON LAW. 
The State insists that the governmental/proprietary 
distinction only applied to municipalities at common law at 
the time the Utah Constitution was adopted, but cites no cases 
holding that when the State itself performed a proprietary 
function it was nevertheless immune from liability. Hipwell 
will not repeat all of the authorities and arguments on this 
issue set forth in Appellee's Brief. However, in addition to 
the authorities cited in her brief, the following additional 
cases each recognized that the governmental/proprietary 
2 
distinction was not limited to municipalities at common law. 
Calkins v. Newton, 97 P. 2d 523 (Cal. 1939) (where there were 
no private general hospitals in the area, the operation of a 
general hospital by the county was a "governmental function11 
but county would be liable for functions of a proprietary 
nature); Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture, 173 S.W. 1143 
(Ken. 1915) (State Board of Agriculture in conducting the 
state fair exercised a governmental function and was therefore 
immune from liability); Jackson & Perkins Co. v. Byron-Bethany 
Irr. Dist., 29 P.2d 217 (Cal. 1934); Willcox v. Erie County, 
297 N.Y.S. 287 (1937) (county's action in constructing and 
maintaining a slide at a public park was a governmental 
function rather than proprietary and therefore the county was 
immune from liability); Bell v. City of Pittsburgh, 146 A. 567 
(Penn. 1929) (county which jointly owned and operated building 
for business and governmental purposes with city held liable 
for negligence in operation of elevator); Yolo v. Modesto Irr. 
Dist., 13 P.2d 908 (Cal. 1932). See also Apfelbacher v. 
State, 152 N.W. 144 (Wis. 1915) (the propagation of fish by 
the state for stocking of public streams is a governmental, 
not a proprietary function, so that the state is immune from 
liability for torts committed during the exercise of such 
function. Whether the state would be liable if the activity 
were considered proprietary was expressly reserved for future 
consideration). 
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In Appellee's Brief, it was argued that prior to the 
adoption of the Utah Constitution states restricted their 
activities to governmental functions and therefore there was 
little, if any, opportunity for the courts to directly address 
the issue of the applicability of the governmental/proprietary 
distinction to the state itself. The State gives short shrift 
to this argument in its brief. However, the historical 
context in which the common law developed with respect to the 
governmental/proprietary distinction is important and is 
illustrated by the case of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. 
v. Wainscott, 19 P.2d 328 (Ariz. 1933). There, suit was 
brought against members of the County Board of Supervisors for 
purchasing liability insurance covering the county's vehicles. 
The court recognized that the county would be liable for 
proprietary functions, but concluded that the county could not 
have legally used the motor vehicles in anything but the 
performance of a governmental function because there was no 
authority for the county to engage in any proprietary 
functions. Thus, because the county could not be liable for 
the performance of a governmental function, liability 
insurance should not have been purchased. 
The State also protests that Hipwell supposedly 
misinterpreted this Court's holding in Bingham v. Board of 
Education of Oaden City, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah 1950). The State 
claims that if this Court had applied the governmental/ 
proprietary distinction, it would have denied the board 
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immunity because the injury in Bingham, so the State claims, 
arose not from the school board's alleged negligent 
performance of its educational function, but from the 
operation of an incinerator to burn books and other garbage on 
school grounds — a supposedly proprietary function. The 
State's position is tortured. The State does not even 
attempt to explain how a school board's burning of old books 
or other garbage is a proprietary function. Clearly, all 
actions which a school board takes in pursuit of educating 
children within its district, including hiring of teachers, 
constructing schools, providing school lunches, maintaining 
buildings, and acquiring and disposing of school books and 
other materials, are governmental functions performed in the 
course of the school board's charge of operating public 
schools. 
B. NO IMMUNITY EXISTED AT COMMON LAW FOR THE 
NEGLIGENCE OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES OR FOR THE TYPE OF 
CONDUCT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. 
The State erroneously contends that employees of state 
hospitals were immune from liability at common law at the time 
the Utah Constitution was adopted because their actions fell 
under the discretionary function exception to liability and 
chides Hipwell for oversimplifying the liability of 
governmental employees under the common law. The State's 
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argument seriously distorts both the immunity of governmental 
employees under the common law at the time of the adoption of 
the Utah Constitution and the scope of the discretionary 
function immunity later adopted by the courts.1 
1. State Employees Were Liable for Negligence at 
Common Law. 
First, the State's argument that at the time the Utah 
Constitution was adopted, governmental employees were immune 
from damages for negligence committed in the performance of 
discretionary acts as opposed to ministerial acts is wrong and 
the State cites no authorities which support that proposition. 
The commentators, including the very law review 
articles relied upon by the State, recognize that under the 
early common law there was no distinction between the 
1
 Sharp and Healy argue in their Reply Briefs that Hipwell did 
not raise below the argument that the Act was unconstitutional 
because it limited suits against individual health care providers. 
In the court below, the issue was whether this court's decision in 
Condemarin was applicable to the case at bar or whether later 
amendments avoided the constitutional infirmities found in 
Condemarin. Sharp and Healy did not raise the issue of whether 
Condemarin had been correctly decided until their last Reply 
Memorandum. That issue was not and could not have been reached 
by the district court. The district court held that Condemarin was 
binding. Therefore, the question of whether if Condemarin was 
incorrectly decided and the damage limitation was valid the Act was 
nevertheless unconstitutional for taking away the right to sue 
individual employees without substituting a reasonably equivalent 
remedy was not before the district court. Moreover, Hipwell did 
in fact raise this argument at the hearing on Sharp's and Healy's 
Motions for Summary Judgment. [Reporter's Transcript of 
Proceedings on March 30, 1992, p. 23-24]. 
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liability of public officers and ordinary citizens for 
negligence. See, e.g., W. Gellhorn and C. Byse, 
Administrative Law, § 8 at p. 335-36 (6th Ed. 1974); G. 
Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 
77 Columbia L.Rev. 1175-78 (1977); J. Flemming, Tort Liability 
of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U.Chi.L.Rev. 610, 
635 (1955). For example, Professor Bermann wrote in the 
Columbia Law Review cited at length by the State that: 
The restlessness of the courts on the 
question of officer immunity reflects conflicting 
policy considerations. On the one hand, 
wrongdoing seems worth deterring or punishing 
whatever hat the wrongdoer happens to wear. 
Moreover, there is something anomalous about 
denying relief to a tort victim simply because he 
had the added misfortune of being injured by a 
public official rather than a private citizen. 
Thus, the common law traditionally did not 
distinguish between public officials and private 
individuals for purposes of determining the scope 
of personal tort liability. In fact, courts that 
drew such a distinction often imposed a stricter 
standard of care on officials than on private 
individuals, holding them personally liable for 
the consequences of simple non-negligent 
mistakes. 
More recently, however, the courts have 
recognized that the threat of personal liability 
may make public officials unduly fearful in their 
exercise of authority and discourage them from 
taking prompt and decisive action. This concern, 
which rests upon the plausible though 
undocumented assumption that such burdens cannot 
be imposed upon individual officials without 
breeding an unhealthy timidity on their part, has 
led many courts to accord administrative 
officials at least a qualified immunity that 
would relieve them of liability for the 
reasonable and good faith exercise of discretion 
within the scope of their authority. Limiting 
immunity to discretionary functions follows from 
the premise that fear of personal liability can 
inhibit conduct only when there is room for 
judgment in deciding whether or how to act. In 
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"ministerial11 matters in which officials are 
thought to have no such discretion, this fear is 
somewhat naively assumed to have no inhibiting 
effect. 
[77 Columbia L.Rev. at 1178-79]. [Emphasis added]. 
Professor Fleming put the matter this way in his 
article in the University of Chicago Law Review relied upon by 
the State: 
The Anglo-American tradition did not include 
a general theory of immunity from suit or from 
liability on the part of public officers. It was 
the boast of Dicey, often-quoted, that "[w]ith us 
every official, from the Prime Minister down to a 
constable of collector of taxes, is under the 
same responsibility for every act done without 
legal justification as any other citizen." . . . 
[H]e was liable in very much the same way as a 
private individual, including the employee of a 
private business, would be. Thus, were an 
officer, authorized by statute to seize undried 
leather, mistakenly but in good faith, seized 
what turned out to be dried leather, he was 
liable as a trespasser. 
[22 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 635]. 
The common law in effect at the time of the adoption 
of the Utah Constitution is well illustrated by Justice 
Holmes' decision in Miller v. Horton, 26 N.E. 100 (Mass. 
1891). In that case, the town commissioners determined that 
the plaintiff's horse had a contagious disease and ordered the 
Board of Health to destroy the animal. The trial court found 
that the horse did*not in fact have the contagious disease, 
but held that the defendants were nevertheless protected from 
liability. Justice Holmes held that the man who killed the 
horse was not protected from liability by the fact that he had 
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been ordered to do so by the commissioners if the horse did 
not have the contagious disease and was fully liable for his 
wrongful act in destroying the horse. 
Similarly, in Lowe v. Conrov, 97 N.W. 942 (Wis. 1904), 
a veterinary official had the duty of destroying diseased 
cattle. He determined that a steer was diseased and ordered 
it destroyed. The jury determined that in fact the steer was 
not diseased, even though the officer had concluded otherwise. 
Judgment against the official for damages was affirmed. 
Finally, in Davie v. Regents of University of 
California. 227 P. 247 (Cal. 1924), suit was instituted 
against the regents of the University of California and 
against a physician who was in charge of an infirmary 
maintained at the university. Demurrers to an amended 
complaint were sustained with respect to both defendants on 
the basis of sovereign immunity. The appellate court upheld 
the sustaining of the demurrer with respect to the university 
on the basis that the operation of the infirmary was solely a 
governmental function, but reversed the sustaining of the 
demurrer as to the individual physician, observing: 
Where wrongs are done to individuals by 
those who are the servants of the government, 
those injured are not remediless, as such 
servants or employees may be sued the same as 
other persons for torts which they have 
committed. 
[227 P. at 248]. 
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The discretionary/ministerial distinction with respect 
to the liability of governmental employees appears to have its 
roots in the principle that judicial officers were absolutely 
immune from liability in discharging their functions. This 
principle was later expanded to quasi-judicial officers and 
then to administrative employees as well. W. Gellhorn and C 
Byse, Administrative Law, supra, at p. 337-38. However, it 
does not appear that the discretionary/ministerial distinction 
immunizing governmental employees for discretionary acts 
gained much acceptance until the 1920's and 1930's. See, 
e.g., Wasserman v. Kenosha, 258 N.W. 857 (Wis. 1935); 
Gottschalk v. Shepperd, 270 N.W. 573 (N.D. 1935). 
The State relies on this Court's decision in Connell 
v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), to show that Utah 
has adopted the discretionary/ministerial distinction. In 
that case, however, the defendants moved to dismiss on the 
basis that the plaintiff's claim against them was "barred by 
the common law doctrine of immunity of judicial and quasi-
judicial officers." [572 P.2d at 698]. [Emphasis added]. 
Although recognizing the distinction, the court held that a 
clerk's duty of entering a citation in the docket book and 
assigning a case number was a ministerial duty. Most 
importantly, this decision in 1977 in no way stated or implied 
that the discretionary/ministerial function distinction was 
recognized under the common law in Utah in effect when the 
constitution was adopted. 
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2. The Negligence Complained of in the Present Case 
Was Committed in the Exercise of a Ministerial Function. 
Even if it were assumed that the discretionary/ 
ministerial distinction applied at common law at the time the 
Utah Constitution was adopted, the negligent acts of Dr. Weiss 
in this case were committed during the performance of a 
ministerial function, not a discretionary function, as 
demonstrated by the very Utah cases relied upon by the State. 
Prosser and Keeton describe the scope of the 
discretionary function immunity as follows: 
It is usually said that the immunity protects 
acts within the scope of the officerfs duty only 
if the acts are "discretionary." This means, 
more or less, that the acts involve some fairly 
high level of policy making. Acts that do not 
qualify as "discretionary" acts are usually 
called "ministerial" and for purely ministerial 
acts of executive officers or employees there is 
no immunity. Acts that create personal risk to 
others and acts involving ordinary considerations 
of physical safety are usually in this category 
where there are no serious governmental concerns. 
[W. Prosser and W. Keeton on Torts, p. 1060 (5th Ed. 1984]. 
In Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1989), Justice Durham recognized that under the law 
existing at the time the 1978 Amendment to the Act was passed, 
public employees were not immune from suit while acting in a 
ministerial capacity even though the employee's acts may 
involve some decision making, that operational acts of 
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employees were not protected and that under the common law in 
existence at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted, 
individual health care providers were liable for their 
negligence. 
In Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 
P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983), cited by the State, this Court set 
forth the following requirements for a discretionary function 
and held the requirements had not been met: 
Where the responsibility for basic policy 
decisions has been committed to one of the 
branches of our tri-partite system of government, 
the courts have refrained from sitting in 
judgment of the propriety of those decisions. 
[Citation omitted] . . . To be purely 
discretionary, an act by the state must be 
affirmed under four preliminary questions: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic governmental 
policy, program or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program, or 
objective as opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of the policy, 
program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, 
judgment, and expertise on the part of the 
governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, 
or lawful authority or duty to do or make the 
challenged act, omission, or decision? [Emphasis 
added]. 
The acts complained of here are the state's 
failure to properly evaluate the home into which 
Jennifer was to be placed, failure to properly 
supervise her placement, and failure to protect 
her from harm, when the state knew or should have 
known that such harm was likely. Assuming that 
the decision to place Jennifer in a foster home 
was a discretionary one, once that decision was 
made and the placement ordered, the question was 
no longer whether the child was to receive foster 
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care, but whether due care was exercised under a 
duty assumed. Where a breach of that duty can be 
shown, the government is held to the same 
standard as private individuals and cannot cloak 
itself with the mantel of discretion. 
Similarly, in Doe v. Arauelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 
1985), another case improperly relied upon by the State, a 
State official was sued for his decision to release a juvenile 
into the community subject to certain conditions and for the 
negligent supervision of the juvenile once he was released 
into the community. This Court held that the decision to 
place the juvenile into the community was shielded from 
liability under the discretionary function exception, but held 
that the later negligent supervision of the juvenile was not 
protected, saying: 
Operational, routine, every day matters not 
requiring evaluation of broad policy factors and 
which only implement established policy are non-
discretionary, ministerial functions. A decision 
or action implementing a pre-existing policy is 
operational in nature and is undeserving of 
protection under the discretionary function 
exception. [Citations omitted] Because a 
probation officer's policy decisions are 
discretionary, he is immune from suit arising 
from those decisions. However, his acts 
implementing the policy must be considered on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether they are 
ministerial and thereby outside immunity 
protections. 
. . . If it can be shown at trial that the 
injury to plaintiff's ward was proximately caused 
by Stromberg's omissions, it did not result from 
the discretion vested in him to place Arguelles 
in the community, but from his negligence in 
monitoring the prescribed treatment after making 
the discretionary decision to do so. Under those 
circumstances, the State would not be immune from 
suit under the discretionary function exception. 
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[716 P.2d at 282-83]. See also Whitt v. Reed, 239 S.W. 2d 
489 (Kan. 1951); Hanslev v. Tilton. 655 S.E.2d 300 (No.Car. 
1951) . 
In the case at bar, the negligence committed by Dr. 
Weiss can hardly be said to have been committed during the 
performance of a discretionary function. His duties simply 
did not involve basic policy-making decisions but were 
operational in nature. Even if it were assumed for purposes 
of argument that Dr. Weiss1 decision to perform the procedure 
on Mrs. Hipwell was a discretionary function, the fact remains 
that Dr. Weiss1 negligent performance of that procedure was 
clearly ministerial. Consequently, the discretionary function 
exception is wholly inapplicable. 
The State relies heavily on Estate of Burks v. Ross, 
438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971), to attempt to support its 
discretionary function argument. Burks offers little, if any, 
assistance. There, the court held that an administrator of a 
veteran's hospital and a doctor who was the director of 
neuropsychiatry were not liable for damages when a patient 
escaped from the hospital and was struck and killed by a train 
because they were involved in discretionary functions. The 
court stated that a "discretionary function or duty" included 
both the initiation of programs and activities and 
determinations made by executors or administrators in 
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations 
and that "where there is room for policy judgment and 
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decision, there is discretion." [438 F.2d at 234]. The court 
held, however, that the actions of the actual nurses and 
assistants involved in the care of patients were ministerial 
and that they were not protected from liability for negligence 
in caring for their patients. 
The State's reliance on Martinez v. Schrock, 537 F.2d 
765 (3rd Cir. 1976) is also misplaced. In Martinez, the Third 
Circuit held that the defendants who were army physicians on 
active duty were not liable for alleged negligence in 
performing surgery on a retired enlisted man. The court based 
its decision not on any discretionary/ministerial distinction 
as implied by the State, but rather upon the court's earlier 
decision in Bailey v. DeOuevedo, 375 F.2d 72, 74 (3rd Cir. 
1967), cert denied 389 U.S. 923, that, "An enlisted man in the 
armed services of the United States cannot maintain an action 
against an Army medical surgeon for negligence in an operation 
performed at an Army hospital in the line of duty." [537 F.2d 
at 766]. 
Brown v. Northbill Reg. Psychiatric Hospital, 395 
N.W.2d 18 (Mich.App. 1986), cited by the State, likewise does 
not support its position. In the first place, it appears that 
Michigan's definition of what constitutes a discretionary 
function is significantly broader than in Utah. But even 
under Michigan law the court recognized that although the 
decision of whether to engage in a particular activity and how 
best to carry it out was a discretionary function, that the 
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actual execution of that decision was a ministerial act. The 
court held that summary judgment had been improperly granted 
on plaintiff's claim that the individual defendants had failed 
to properly follow rules and procedures for discharging a 
psychiatric patient on the basis that if a rule or standard 
existed requiring that the discharge of a patient be 
accompanied by medication and through negligence no medication 
was administered, then that would be a negligent ministerial 
act.2 
C. THE ACT DID NOT SUBSTITUTE A REASONABLY EQUIVALENT 
REMEDY. 
The State argues that even if the Act restricted a 
right which Hipwell had under the common law to sue the 
individual employees of the University Hospital that the Act 
is constitutional because it substituted a reasonably 
equivalent remedy. The State reaches this conclusion by 
positing that the Act substituted a solvent defendant for "an 
often financially irresponsible defendant" and that the Act 
enhances chances of recovery by eliminating the need to 
2
 Brown also noted that in order for the discretionary 
function exception to apply, the act performed must be within the 
scope of the officer's authority or the employee must have 
reasonably so believed. There is no evidence in this case that Dr. 
Weiss had the authority to perform this type of procedure, which 
he had never performed before. 
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establish the fault of any governmental employee. These 
arguments are absolutely without merit. 
The State relies principally on the argument that by 
waiving governmental immunity against the state up to 
$250,000.00, that the Act substituted a solvent defendant for 
financially irresponsible defendants. First of all, it is 
important to note that the original Governmental Immunity Act 
did not limit recovery against the University Hospital. When 
the 1978 Amendment was passed enacting the $250,000.00 damage 
limitation and shielding employees from personal liability, 
the State did not substitute any remedy. The State had 
already waived immunity back in 1965. 
Moreover, it is suspect at best to assert that the 
Statefs actions in depriving injured persons of unlimited 
recovery against physicians and other medical personnel 
employed by the State can be constitutionally validated by 
substituting a severely limited right of recovery against the 
State, especially in view of the prevalence of medical 
malpractice insurance. Of course, since Sharp and Healy filed 
their motion for summary judgment almost at the outset of this 
case, Sharp and Healy have presented no evidence whatsoever 
that would support any finding that substitution of a 
$250,000.00 remedy against the State is a reasonable 
equivalent remedy to the right to recover unlimited damages 
against physicians and other hospital employees. At the very 
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least, this is a question of fact which would have to be 
resolved at trial. 
The State does not cite one case in support of its 
argument that the limited remedy against the State is a 
reasonably equivalent substitute remedy. Instead, the State 
cites extensively from two law review articles, Integrating 
Governmental and Officer Tort Liability. 77 Columbia L.Rev. 
1175 (1977) and Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their 
Officers, 22 U.Chi.L.Rev. 610 (1955), to attempt to support 
its arguments. However, those law review articles do not even 
attempt to deal with issues raised by statutes which limit 
damages recoverable against the State and the articles are 
consequently of little value in deciding the issues raised in 
the case at bar. 
The State•s next argument that the Act enhances 
chances of recovery by eliminating the need to establish the 
fault of any individual governmental employee borders on the 
absurd. In all cases (absent the applicability of some 
special doctrine such as res ipsa loquitur), a plaintiff is 
going to have to show that some human being acted or failed to 
act negligently or wrongfully in order to recover from the 
State. For example, in the present case, Hipwell is going to 
have to prove at trial that Dr. Weiss and/or some other 
specific employees at the University Hospital acted 
negligently with respect to their treatment of Hipwell. The 
Act did not purport to nor did it eliminate any need to prove 
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wrongdoing by specific state employees or representatives nor 
otherwise reduce a plaintiff's burden of proving negligence or 
other wrongdoing against the State. 
D. THE ACT WAS NOT A REASONABLE MEANS OF ACHIEVING 
IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES. 
Finally, rehashing the arguments which it 
unsuccessfully urged upon this Court in Condemarin. the State 
argues that the restriction on the right to sue government 
employees and the damage limitation were reasonable means 
employed by the legislature to combat the "vast potential 
liability of the state" which could result in "such severe 
cutbacks in essential governmental services as to seriously 
hamper state government." As this Court noted in Condemarin. 
and as the State itself recognizes in its Brief [p. 20, fn. 
7], there is absolutely no evidence to demonstrate any such 
crisis. In any event, under Condemarin. the existence of such 
a crisis would not be a reason to shift the entire burden of 
catastrophic injury onto the shoulders of the injured and 
there is no reason to suppose that limiting the rights of 
victims will produce the benefits envisioned by the 
legislature. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons and those set forth in 
Appellees' Brief, it is respectfully submitted that the 
district court's decision should be affirmed. 
DATED this j — day of January, 1993. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
^^fi^^M 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs/Appellees 
jt hipwell.app\bncf.2 
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